Comando Vermelho a terrorist group? Inside the US pressure to classify CV and PCC as terrorist organizations
Anyone following public security policy knows the debate about labeling criminal factions as terrorist isn't new, but it has gained a quiet urgency in the corridors of Brasília over the last 48 hours. Sources tracking the bilateral negotiations have confirmed to me: the pressure from Washington to place Comando Vermelho and the PCC on the list of foreign terrorist organizations has never been more concrete. And now, the Brazilian government has to walk a tightrope, trying not to step on Uncle Sam's toes while still maintaining its sovereign stance.
The ghost of the "Shield of the Americas" and Itamaraty's reaction
This story goes way back. Back when then-President Trump flirted with the idea of extending tough US anti-terrorism laws to our factions, Itamaraty issued cautious statements. But what was once scattered smoke has turned into a bonfire in recent months, especially after the State Department began a detailed analysis of CV's modus operandi along the borders and in the Amazon. The American argument is simple: organizations that control territories with extreme violence, engage in narco-terrorism, and destabilize entire regions aren't just ordinary criminal gangs. They're aiming for a broader concept of terrorism, one that goes far beyond airplane hijackings like the tragic Lufthansa Flight 181 in 1977 — that classic case study from security academies, which now seems almost quaint compared to the lethal sophistication of organized crime.
The problem is that, for Brazil, accepting the "terrorist" label for Comando Vermelho is a bitter pill to swallow. Behind the scenes, I heard from a high-ranking government source that the concern isn't just semantic. It's practical: if the US activates its anti-terrorism apparatus, they could freeze assets, block transactions, and, most importantly, issue red notices that stall any international negotiation involving suspects. And that's where it gets complicated. Imagine the Federal Police trying to cooperate technically with the FBI while, at the same time, the Americans are treating CV as a group equivalent to Al-Qaeda? That executive order could create one hell of a diplomatic rift.
When crime becomes a "Command Performance"
Anyone tracking CV's operations in Rio or the Amazon knows their level of planning and audacity is impressive. The invasions of communities, attacks on police vehicles, and the logistics of transporting drugs to Europe aren't amateur moves. On the contrary, they are true Command Performances — displays of command, as they say in military jargon — where every move is calculated for maximum impact. It's no wonder that US security analysts compare some CV tactics to those used by groups considered terrorist in Colombia and Mexico. They point, for example, to the use of explosives against security forces and the systematic intimidation of entire populations — characteristics that blur the line between organized crime and terrorism.
Last week, an intelligence report shared between Brazilian police and US intelligence agencies made it clear that CV is no longer content with dominating local drug markets. The faction has international wings, negotiates directly with producers in Bolivia and Peru, and maintains cells even in European countries. This global reach is what scares the Americans most. For them, the threat is no longer local; it has become a vector for continental destabilization.
The practical effects of a Washington directive
If the State Department formalizes the designation, what actually changes on the ground in the favelas and in Brazilian courts? The truth is, in the short term, very little. CV will continue to rule the communities it already controls, and the PCC will still dictate terms inside the prison system. But in the medium term, the effects could be profound:
- Freezing of international assets: Any bank account or investment linked to faction leaders on US soil could be seized.
- Easier extradition: The anti-terrorism mechanism allows the US to request the handover of suspects with less red tape, including pressuring neighboring countries.
- Pressure on Brazilian banks: Financial institutions handling suspicious money could face severe US sanctions, forcing a crackdown on donations and faction financing.
- Diplomatic stigma: Brazil could be seen as a country that doesn't control its own territory, opening the door for interventions disguised as "cooperation."
On the other hand, some see an opportunity. Police chiefs I spoke with behind the scenes in Congress believe the label could unlock US resources and technology currently out of our reach. "If they want to help us fight terrorists, they should foot the bill," one summed up, in a remark blending irony and pragmatism.
The Brazilian balancing act
The Planalto palace is trying to juggle two things: it can't be accused of being soft on crime, but it also doesn't want to fuel interventionist rhetoric. In recent days, drafts of official notes have been circulating that seek a third way — acknowledging the severity of the factions, but rejecting the terrorist classification on the grounds that the Brazilian Constitution has its own tools to deal with the problem. It's a complicated dance, especially with public opinion increasingly sensitive to the issue.
And you, what do you think? Does calling Comando Vermelho terrorist actually solve anything, or does it just further complicate relations with our northern neighbors? One thing is certain: the debate is far from over, and the next time you hear about CV, it might come with a new adjective — imposed from outside, but one that will echo for a long time in South America's security decisions.