Is Comando Vermelho terrorist? Inside the US pressure to classify CV and PCC as terrorist organizations
If you follow public security policy, you know the debate about labelling gangs as terrorist isn't new, but it's gained a quiet urgency in the corridors of Brasília over the past 48 hours. Sources following the bilateral negotiations have confirmed to me: the pressure from Washington to list Comando Vermelho and the PCC as foreign terrorist organisations has never been more concrete. And now, the Brazilian government has to dance to the tune, trying not to step on Uncle Sam's toes while still maintaining its sovereign stance.
The ghost of the "Shield of the Americas" and Itamaraty's reaction
This story goes way back. Back when then-President Trump first floated the idea of extending tough US anti-terrorism laws to our gangs, Itamaraty issued cautious statements. But what was once scattered smoke has turned into a bonfire in recent months, especially after the State Department began closely analysing CV's modus operandi along the borders and in the Amazon. The Americans' argument is simple: organisations that control territories with extreme violence, engage in narco-terrorism, and destabilise entire regions are not mere common criminal gangs. They're aiming for a broader concept of terrorism, one that goes far beyond plane hijackings like the tragic Lufthansa Flight 181 in 1977 — that classic case everyone studies in security academies, but which now seems almost quaint compared to the lethal sophistication of organised crime.
The problem is, for Brazil, accepting the "terrorist" label for Comando Vermelho is a bitter pill to swallow. Behind the scenes, I heard from a high-ranking government source that the concern isn't just semantic. It's practical: if the US activates its anti-terrorism apparatus, they could freeze assets, block transactions, and, most importantly, issue red notices that freeze any international negotiations involving suspects. And that's where things get complicated. Imagine the Federal Police trying to cooperate technically with the FBI while, at the same time, the Americans treat CV as a group equivalent to Al-Qaeda? That kind of executive action could create one hell of a diplomatic rift.
When crime becomes a "Command Performance"
Anyone following CV's operations in Rio or the Amazon knows their level of planning and audacity is impressive. The invasions of communities, attacks on police vehicles, and the logistics for transporting drugs to Europe are not amateur actions. On the contrary, they are true Command Performances — displays of command, as they say in military jargon — where every move is studied for maximum impact. It's no wonder that US security analysts compare some CV tactics to those used by groups considered terrorist in Colombia and Mexico. They point, for example, to the use of explosives against security forces and the systematic intimidation of entire populations, characteristics that blur the line between organised crime and terrorism.
Last week, an intelligence report shared between Brazilian police and US intelligence agencies made it clear that CV is no longer content with controlling local drug markets. The gang has international reach, negotiates directly with producers in Bolivia and Peru, and maintains cells even in European countries. It's this global reach that most scares the Americans. For them, the threat is no longer local but has become a vector for continental destabilisation.
The practical effects of a Washington decision
If the State Department formalises the classification, what changes on the ground in the favelas and in Brazilian courts? The truth is, in the short term, very little. CV will continue to rule the communities it already rules, and the PCC will still dictate terms in the prison system. But in the medium term, the effects could be profound:
- Freezing of international assets: Any bank accounts or investments linked to gang leaders on US soil could be confiscated.
- Facilitated extradition: Anti-terrorism mechanisms allow the US to request the handover of suspects with less bureaucracy, including putting pressure on neighbouring countries.
- Pressure on Brazilian banks: Financial institutions that handle suspicious money could face severe US sanctions, forcing a crackdown on donations and financing for the gangs.
- Diplomatic stigma: Brazil could be seen as a country that doesn't control its territory, opening the door for interventions disguised as "cooperation."
On the other hand, some see an opportunity. Police chiefs I've spoken with behind the scenes in Congress believe the label could unlock US resources and technology that are currently out of our reach. "If they want to help us fight terrorists, they can foot the bill," one summed up, in an outburst mixing irony and pragmatism.
The Brazilian shuffle
The Planalto Palace is trying to walk a fine line: it can't be accused of being soft on crime, but it also doesn't want to fuel interventionist rhetoric. In recent days, drafts of official statements have been circulating that seek a third way — acknowledging the seriousness of the gangs but rejecting the terrorist classification, understanding that the Brazilian Constitution has its own tools to deal with the problem. It's a complicated dance, especially with public opinion increasingly sensitive to the issue.
What do you think? Does calling Comando Vermelho terrorist actually solve anything, or does it just further complicate relations with our neighbours up north? One thing's for sure: the debate is far from over, and the next time you hear about CV, it might just come with a new adjective — one imposed from outside, but one that will echo for a long time in South America's security decisions.