NIS quietly completes personnel reshuffle without a 'bloodbath'? A message from Professor Sohn Hoh-chul

One of the hottest topics in and around South Korean political circles right now is undoubtedly the actions of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). In particular, there's intense interest in how the NIS is pulling itself together internally following the December 3 emergency martial law incident last year, and what has become of the many NIS officials. With personnel moves for senior officials from Level 1 down to Level 4 already quietly finalised last August and November, various interpretations are emerging regarding the nature of this reshuffle.

Breaking the vicious cycle of 'purges'? The first test for Lee Jong-seok's pragmatism

During past transitions of government, the NIS was a place where a cold wind of change would blow, often earning the notorious label of 'bloody purges'. It became a sort of established practice that when a new administration took office, all Level 1 directors would be placed on standby simultaneously, with successors gradually appointed in their place. However, the first NIS personnel reshuffle under the current Lee Jae-myung government was different. During the reshuffle of around 20 Level 1 directors last August, a significant number appointed under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration were retained.

The prevailing view is that this directly reflects the principles of 'prohibiting political retaliation' and 'prioritising expertise' that NIS Director Lee Jong-seok promised during his confirmation hearing. In the past, it was commonplace for the NIS to lose accumulated know-how as it constantly looked over its shoulder at the administration in power. This time, however, the reshuffle seems to place emphasis on organisational stability under a 'pragmatism' framework, prioritising operational continuity. In fact, it was an open secret within the NIS that "as long as you have the ability, you won't be pushed out just because you served under the previous administration."

So, how was the December 3 martial law situation handled internally?

Of course, this hasn't completely answered all questions. The biggest lingering question concerns the NIS's internal review regarding the emergency martial law incident. According to internal sources, the NIS has been investigating the involvement of its employees in the martial law declaration since shortly after Director Lee took office, and the results of this investigation were factored into the recent personnel decisions. It is understood that this review was conducted as an extension of the usual inspection process that accompanies the arrival of a new director.

In simple terms, the two rounds of reshuffles last August and November weren't just about reassigning roles; they also served as a clean-up operation to mitigate the political risk associated with 'martial law involvement'. According to a high-ranking political source, there were extensive internal discussions within the intelligence community regarding this reshuffle, and it's understood that a position has been formulated to revamp intelligence-gathering systems for potential future contingencies.

The NIS 'now' through the lens of Sohn Hoh-chul

A key figure to consider here is Professor Sohn Hoh-chul, an emeritus professor at Sogang University. Widely known as a progressive political scientist, he actually has a fairly deep connection with the NIS. During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, when the NIS launched a truth commission into past affairs (the so-called 'Past Affairs Committee'), he participated directly as an academic representative. Notably, the investigation he was involved in was the crucial task of uncovering the truth behind the manipulated 'People's Revolutionary Party Reconstruction Committee Incident' during the Park Chung-hee regime. At the time, he described the incident as "the most disgraceful event in our nation's judicial history" and contributed to uncovering the facts.

Furthermore, in the early 2000s, he offered a冷静分析 on the 'leftist controversy' that arose over the significant number of former student activists entering the National Assembly. At the time, Professor Sohn clearly stated his conviction: "The entry of former activists into the National Assembly isn't a new phenomenon, and not all of them are leftists. If they form a reformist bloc and adhere to principles, there's no cause for concern." This background demonstrates that he is not merely a theorist but a scholar who acts as a 'living witness' with deep insight into both historical context and on-the-ground realities.

If he were to look at the NIS today, what might he say? Perhaps something like this:

• First, the most important thing is not to repeat the misuse of state power seen in the past, like the 'People's Revolutionary Party' incident. He knows better than anyone that the organisation's political neutrality is its lifeblood.
• Second, he would advise that the 'pragmatism' revealed in the personnel moves should not merely be about clearing promotion blockages, but must flourish on the foundation of 'expertise'. This means that the 'principles and integrity' he advocated over two decades ago should become core values in the NIS's operation.
• Third, he would likely emphasise 'principled engagement' regarding North Korea policy. After all, he has consistently supported the Sunshine Policy while maintaining that North Korea's wrongdoings must be dealt with firmly.

Where should the NIS head now?

In summary, the NIS now appears to have shed the outdated practice of a 'clean sweep' reshuffle and embarked on its maiden voyage along a new course charted by pragmatism. Director Lee Jong-seok's choice to prioritise organisational stability even amidst the extreme variable of the martial law incident seems to be garnering considerable trust, at least internally within the NIS.

Of course, many hurdles remain. Key points to watch will be whether this same principle continues for the upcoming Level 2 and 3 appointments, whether North Korea intelligence-gathering capabilities can be revived as before, and most importantly, whether the value of 'political neutrality' can be upheld. This is precisely why we need to listen carefully to the sharp questions posed by senior academics like Professor Sohn Hoh-chul, questioning whether the National Intelligence Service of South Korea can truly reinvent itself as a professional security body.