NIS wraps up personnel changes without a major bloodbath? A message from Professor Son Ho-chul

One of the hottest topics in South Korean political circles right now is undoubtedly the actions of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). There's intense interest in how the agency is pulling itself together following the December 3 emergency martial law declaration last year, and what's become of numerous NIS executives. With personnel changes for executives from Level 1 down to Level 4 quietly wrapped up last August and November, various interpretations are emerging about the nature of these reshuffles.

Breaking the vicious cycle of a 'clean sweep'? The first real test for Lee Jong-suk's pragmatism

During past changes of government, the NIS was a place where a 'windswept' bloodbath was the norm, earning it a stigma of 'bloody purges'. The established practice was that when a new administration came in, all Level 1 executives would be placed on standby, and successors would be systematically appointed. However, the first NIS personnel changes under the new Lee Jae-myung government were different. In the reshuffle of around 20 Level 1 executives last August, a significant number appointed during the Yoon Suk Yeol administration were retained.

The prevailing view is that this reflects NIS Director Lee Jong-suk's commitment to 'no political retaliation' and a 'focus on expertise' that he promised during his confirmation hearing. Previously, it was common for the NIS's accumulated know-how to be lost as it tried to read the political winds. But this time, the emphasis seems to be on continuity and stabilising the organisation under a framework of 'pragmatism'. In fact, it's an open secret within the NIS that "if you have the ability, you won't be pushed out just because you were appointed under the previous government."

So, how was the December 3 martial law situation handled internally?

Of course, this hasn't completely answered all the questions. The biggest one concerns the NIS's internal clean-up operation regarding the emergency martial law incident. According to sources within the agency, the NIS has been investigating its employees' potential involvement in the martial law declaration since Director Lee took office, and the results were factored into these personnel decisions. This is seen as an extension of the audit process typically conducted when a new director is appointed.

In short, the two rounds of personnel changes last August and November weren't just about shifting roles; they also served to remove the political risk associated with 'martial law involvement'. According to a high-ranking political source, there were extensive discussions within the intelligence community regarding these changes, and it's understood that a position has been set to reorganise intelligence-gathering systems for any future contingencies.

NIS through the eyes of Son Ho-chul: A reality check

A key figure to watch here is Professor Son Ho-chul, an emeritus professor at Sogang University. A well-known progressive political scientist, he actually has a significant connection to the NIS. During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, when the NIS launched a probe into past wrongdoings (through the so-called 'Past History Committee'), he participated directly as a representative from academia. Notably, the investigation he was involved in was the crucial task of uncovering the truth behind the 'People's Revolutionary Party Reconstruction Committee' case, which was fabricated under the Park Chung-hee regime. At the time, he called the case "the most disgraceful episode in our nation's judicial history" and actively contributed to uncovering the truth.

Furthermore, in the early 2000s, he offered a冷静 analysis of the so-called 'leftist controversy' surrounding the election of many former activists to the National Assembly. Back then, Professor Son clearly stated his belief: "The election of former activists to the National Assembly isn't a new phenomenon, and they aren't all leftists. If they form a reform bloc and stick to their principles, it's nothing to worry about." This background shows he's not just a theorist, but a scholar who acts as a 'living witness' with a deep understanding of both the field and history.

If he were to look at the NIS today, what might he say? Probably something like this:

• First, the most important thing is not to repeat the past misuse of state power, like in the People's Revolutionary Party case. He knows better than anyone that an organisation's political neutrality is its lifeblood.
• Second, he would likely advise that the 'pragmatism' shown in these personnel changes needs to go beyond simply clearing a backlog and truly blossom from the soil of 'expertise'. This means the 'principles and integrity' he advocated for over 20 years ago should become core values in running the NIS.
• Third, he would probably emphasise 'principled engagement' regarding North Korea. In the past, he consistently supported the Sunshine Policy but also maintained that North Korea's wrongdoings must be firmly addressed.

Where to now for the NIS?

In summary, the NIS appears to have shed the old habit of 'clean sweep personnel changes' and embarked on its maiden voyage along a new course of pragmatism. Director Lee Jong-suk's choice to prioritise organisational stability, even amidst the worst-case scenario of the martial law declaration, seems to be garnering considerable trust, at least internally.

Of course, many hurdles remain. Whether this same approach will continue with the remaining Level 2 and 3 appointments, whether North Korea intelligence-gathering capabilities can be revived, and most importantly, whether the value of 'political neutrality' can be upheld are the key points to watch going forward. It's precisely why we need to heed the sharp questions posed by senior academics like Professor Son Ho-chul about whether the National Intelligence Service can truly be reborn as a group of genuine security experts.